Information advantage in cournot oligopoly. by Einy, Ezra et al.
Working Paper 99-76 
Economics Series 28 
October 1999 
Departamento de Economia 
Universidad CarIos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid,  126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (341) 624-98-75 
INFORMATION ADVANTAGE IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY ** 
Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz * 
Abstract -------------------------------
We  model an oligopolistic industry where a number of firms  that are  asymmetrically informed 
about the  environment compete via quantities,  and we  study how the  information available to  a 
firm  affects  its  equilibrium profits.  Indeed  we  find  that  if all  firms  have  access  to  the  same 
constant returns to scale technology, in any Bayesian equilibrium the information advantage of a 
firm is rewarded. 
Keywords:  Cournot  Oligopoly,  Asymmetric  Information,  Information  Advantage,  Bayesian 
Equilibrium, Correlated Equilibrium. 
* Einy,  Departament  of Economics,  Ben  Gurion  University  of the  Negev  (Beer  Sheva,  Israel 
84105).  E-mail:  einy@bgumail.bgu.ac.il;  Moreno,  Departamento  de  Economia,  Universidad 
CarIos  III  de  Madrid  (28903  Getafe,  Spain).  E-mail:  dmoreno@eco.uc3m.es;  Shitovitz, 
Department  of  Economics,  University  of  Haifa  (Haifa,  Israel  31905).  E-mail: 
binya@econ.haifa.ac.il 
**  This  work was  done  while Einy and  Shitovitz visited the  Department of Economics of the 
U  niversidad CarIos III de Madrid. Moreno acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of 
Education (DGES), grant PB97-0091. 1  Introduction 
In strategic settings in which agents are asymmetrically informed about the environ-
ment, it is natural to ask the question whether an individual's information advantage 
is rewarded. It is easy to find examples of equilibria, however, in which an individual 
is worse off than other individuals in spite of the fact that his information is superior 
(see,  e.g.  Milgrom and Roberts (1982),  and Example 3.4 below).  Thus, no general 
results are to be found.  Nevertheless, in some specific economic contexts it has been 
established that an agent with an information advantage is unambiguously better off. 
The issue of information advantage has been a recurrent topic in the literature 
on auctions.  Milgrom (1979), for  example, has shown that in a first price auction if 
Bidder A has an information advantage over Bidder B (i.e., if A's information par-
tition is  finer  than B's),  then in any equilibrium B's expected payoff is  zero,  and 
therefore it is less than or equal to A's expected payoff (see also Milgrom and Weber 
(1982),  Theorem 3).  In the literature on general equilibrium with differential infor-
mation, it has been studied how alternative solution concepts treat the information 
advantage of a trader.  Einy,  Moreno and Shitovitz (1998),  for  example, show that, 
when there is no information exchange, (Radner) competitive equilibria and (private) 
core allocations reward the information advantage of a trader (see also Koutsougeras 
and Yannelis (1993)).  In this context, Krasa and Yannelis (1994) argue that Shapley 
(private) value allocations also reward the information advantage of a trader. 
In the present paper we model an oligopolistic industry where a number of firms 
that are asymmetrically informed about the environment compete via quantities, and 
we study how the information available to a firm affects its equilibrium profits. Indeed 
we find that in an industry where firms have access to the same constant returns to 
scale technology,  the information advantage of a firm  is  rewarded;  i.e.,  if Firm A 
has an information advantage over Firm B, then in any Bayesian equilibrium of the 
Cournot game with differential information associated to the industry the ex-ante 
expected profits of Firm A are greater than or equal to the ex-ante expected profits 
of Firm B. 
An interesting corollary of our results is that when there is complete information 
1 about the environment, the correlated equilibria of the industry's associated (com-
plete information)  Cournot game have the same property.  That is,  every correlated 
equilibrium relative to a correlation device for which Firm A has an information ad-
vantage over Firm B yields expected profits for  Firm A greater than or equeal to 
those of Firm B. 
2  The Model 
Consider an oligopolistic industry where a group of firms  N  =  {I, ...  n},  n  ~ 2, 
compete in the production of a homogeneous good.  There is uncertainty about the 
industry's demand and the firms' costs.  This uncertainty is described by a probability 
space (n,F, J-L),  where n is the set of states of nature, F  is a u-field of subsets of n, 
and J-L  is a u-additive probability measure on (0., F). (We interpret J-L  as the common 
prior of the firms.)  Once the state of nature wEn is realized, the market demand, 
and the firms's costs (the same for  all firms)  are determined.  Write p : 0. x  ~+  -+ ~ 
for  the inverse market demand function,  and write c : 0.  x  ~+ -+  ~  for  the firms' 
cost function.  Firms do not observe the state of nature that actually occurs, but may 
have some information about the state. The information of a firm i  E N  is described 
by a measurable partition Pi  of 0.  (i.e., Pi  is a finite or countable family of disjoint 
sets in F which have positive probability and their union is 0). We denote by Fi the 
u-subfield of F generated by the partition Pi.  If  Wo  is the true state of nature, Firm 
i observes the member of Pi containing Wo.  An oligopolistic industry with differential 
information is thus described by a collection 1= (N, (0., F, J-L), p, c, (.1i)iEN). 
As  in Savage's model (see Savage (1954)),  in our model the private information 
of a firm is described by a partition of the space of states of nature.  An alternative 
approach due to Harsanyi (1967-68), represents agents' private information by a set 
of types, and takes the set of states of nature to be the cross product of the sets of 
agents' types.  Jackson (1991)  has shown that both approaches are equivalent (see 
also Section 2 in Vorha (1999)). 
We now introduce the following standard definition from probability theory.  Let 
2 T  be a set.  A family {XthET of random variables on n  is called uniformly integrable 
if 
lim sup  {  IXtl dp, =  O. 
0-+00 tET J{IXtl~o} 
We say that a function f ; n  x  ~+  ~  ~  is  uniformly integrable if 
(2.1) for all x E ~+  the function f(', x) is .1'-measurable, and 
(2.2) the family {f(',  X)}xE~+ of random variables is uniformly integrable. 
Throughout the paper we assume that the inverse demand function P and the cost 
function c  of any oligopolistic industry with differential information are uniformly 
integrable. 
Let  I  be an oligopolistic  industry with differential  information.  The Bayesian 
game  associated with I  is the collection G(I) =  (N, (n,.1',p,),~+, (.ri)iEN, (7ri)iEN), 
where for each i  E N, 7ri  : n  x  ~~  ~  ~, the profit function of firm i, is given for  all 
wEn and r =  (rI,'"  ,rn )  E ~~ by 
7ri(W, r) =  riP(w, L rj) - c(w, ri)' 
jEN 
We refer to G(I) as the Cournot game with differential information associated with 
the industry I. 
Let G(I) be a Cournot game with differential information.  A random strategy 
for  a firm i  E N  is  an .ri-measurable function qi  ; n  ~  ~+ whose first  and second 
moments exist.  We denote by Si the set of all random strategies for firm i, and by S 
the set TIjEN Sj of profiles of random strategies. 
Let X be a random variable on (n,.1', p,), and let Q be a u-subfield of.1'. We denote 
.. 
by E(X I  Q)  the conditional expectation of X  with respect to Q.  Our assumptions 
on p, c,  and on the set of strategies of every firm guarantee that for all i  E N  and 
q E S, E(7ri(', q(.)) l.1'i) exists. 
Let G(I) be a Cournot game with differential information. A Bayesian equilibrium 
is a profile of random strategies q*  =  (q;, .. .  q~) E S such that for  every i  E N  and 
every qi  E Si, 
3 for  almost every w E O. 
Remark 2.1. The equilibrium condition (2.3) requires that at a Bayesian equilibrium 
every firm maximizes its (interim) conditional expected profit at every state of nature. 
This condition is equivalent to requiring that each firm maximizes its ex-ante expected 
profit; i.e., condition (2.3) is equivalent to 
(2.4) 
for  every i  E N  and every qi  E  Si.  This equivalence is obvious in Harsanyi's model 
of Bayesian games  (see,  e.g.,  Section 6.4  in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991»,  where 
uncertainty is  about the players' types.  We  show that it also holds  in our model. 
Clearly (2.3)  implies  (2.4).  In order to prove the converse,  assume,  contrary to our 
claim, that q*  satisfies (2.4)  but it does not satisfy (2.3). Then there exists an event 
B E F with /-L( B) > 0, a firm i  E N  and a strategy qi  E Si such that 
for every wEB. Let A E 'Pi  be such that /-L(A n B) > 0,  and define 
Then qi  is Fi-measurable, and thus qi  E Si.  Now let Wo  E An B. Then 
E(7ri(·' (qi(·), q:'i(·»)))  - In 7ri(W, (qi(W), q:'i(w»d/-L 
- r  7ri(W, (qi(W), q:'i(w»)d/-L + r 7ri(W, q*(w»d/-L 
lA  lO\A 
- /-L(A)E(7ri(., (qi(·), q:'i(·») 1.1i)(wo) + r 7ri(W, q*(w»d/-L 
lO\A 
>  /-L(A)E(7ri(·, q*(.») I  .ri)(WO) + r  7ri(W, q*(w»)d/-L 
JO\A 
- E(7ri(·,q*(·»). 
But this contradicts (2.4). 
4 3  Information Advantage in Bayesian Equilibria 
Proposition  3.1  and Theorem  A  establish the main  result  of this paper:  In an 
oligopolistic industry with differential information where firms  compete via quan-
tities, if  firms' marginal cost is constant then the information advantage of a firm is 
rewarded;  i.e.,  if Firm i  has better information than Firm j, then in any Bayesian 
equilibrium the (ex-ante) expected profits of Firm i are greater than or equal to those 
of Firm j. 
The following proposition establishes our result when the inverse demand function 
is differentiable at every state of nature. 
Proposition 3.1.  Let  J  = (N,(n,F,/-l),p,C,(:fi)iEN)  be  an  oligopolistic  industry 
with differential information.  Assume that 
(P.1)  for all wEn, c(w,·) is affine on ~+; and 
(P.2)  for all wEn, p(w,·)  is non-increasing and differentiable  on  ~+, and its 
derivative p' is uniformly integmble. 
Let i,j E  N  be  any two  firms  such that :fi 2  Fj  (i.e.,  Firm i's information 
partition is at least as fine as that of  Firm j), and let q*  be  any Bayesian equilibrium 
of G(J).  Then 
For the proof of Proposition 3.1  we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.2.  Let J  = (N, (n,F,/-l),p,c, (:fi)iEN)  be  an  oligopolistic  industry with 
differential information,  and let q =  (ql,""  qn)  E S.  Then for all kEN and all 
wEn we have 
E(p(·, L  qi(')) I  Fk)(W) =  E(P(·,qk(W) +  L  ql)) I  Fk)(W), 
iEN  iEN\{k} 
Proof: Let kEN and Wo  E n. Denote by A(wo) the atom of Fk  containing Wo 
(i.e., A(wo) E Pk). Since qk  is Fk-measurable, it is constant on A(wo). Now 
E(p(., Lqi('))IFk)(wo)  -
iEN 
5 (A~  ))  f  p(w, qk(WO) +  L  qi(w))dJL 
JL  Wo  J  A(wo)  iEN\{k} 
- E(P(·,qk(WO) +  L  qi(·)) !Fk)(WO).O 
iEN\{k} 
With Lemma 3.2 in hand we can now prove Proposition 3.1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1:  Let J =  (N, (0, F, JL),p, c, (J=i)iEN)  be an oligopolis-
tic industry with differential information satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 
3.1, and let i,j E  N  be such that J=i  2 Fj •  Without loss of generality assume that 
for  all wE 0, c(w,O)  =  0,  and let d: 0  ~  ~+ denote the marginal cost function.  In 
order to reduce notation, in the rest of the proof we identify p(  W, .) with p(  W, •  ) - d( w). 
Let q* be a Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game with differential information 
G(J).  Write Q* =  EiEN qi. Since for  all kEN the function qZ  is Fk-measurable, by 
Theorem 34.3.  of Billingsley (1986) we have 
(3.1) 
Further, for  each kEN, qZ  maximizes firm k's conditional expected profits (given 
q~k). Hence Lemma 3.2 and the first order conditions for maximization of Firm k's 
conditional expected profits yield 
qZE(p'(., Q*(.)) !  Fk) + E(p(·, Q*(.)) I  Fk)  =  o.  (3.2) 
For every kEN let 
Ak = {w EO! E(p'(., Q*(.))  !Fk)(W) = O} . 
Then Ak  E Fk! and by (3.1)  and (3.2)  we have 
for  all wEAk. By (3.2), for  all kEN and all W  E O\Ak we have 
qZ(w) =  E~~S(.~~~·l!)~ r~~~~)·  (3.4) 
Therefore (3.1) yields 
E(7r  (.  q*(.)) !  :;=,  )(w) =  (E(p(., Q*(.)) !  Fk))2 (w) 
k  ,  k  E(  -P'(., Q*(.)) !Fk)(W) ,  (3.5) 
6 for  all kEN and all w E n\Ak •  Since :Fi  2 Fj ,  by Theorem 34.4.  of Billingsley 
(1986) we have 
E(Z I  Fj )  =  E (E (Z I  :Fi) I  :fj) ,  (3.6) 
for every integrable random variable Z on n. 
Let Y =  JE(  -P'("  Q*(.)) I  :Fi).  Then Y  ~ 0 on n and Y > 0 on n\Ai .  For all 
wEn define 
{ 
E(P(-,Q*O}IFj}{w}  if w E n\A· 
X(w) =  Y(w)  " 
o  otherwise. 
Since p'(w, Q*(w))  ::;  0 for  all wEn, by  (3.2),  X  ~ 0 on n. Also by (3.3)  and the 
definition of X  we have 
XY =  E(P(.,Q*(·)) I  Fi), 
and 
Now (3.6)  and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality yield 
(E(p(·, Q*(.)) I  Fj ))2  - (E (E(P(·, Q*(.)) I  :Fi) I  Fj ))2 
- (E (XY I  F j ))2 
<  E (X2 I  :fj) E (y2 I  Fj ) 
- E(E(7ri(·,q*(·)) I  J=i) I  :fj)E(E(-p'(.,Q*(.)) I  J=i)  l:fj) 
- E(7ri(·,q*(·)) I  :fj)E(-p'(.,Q*(.)) I  Fj ). 
Therefore by (3.3) and (3.5) we have 
(3.8) 
Now, by taking integrals over n on both sides of (3.8) we obtain 
which establishes the proposition.  0 
The following generalization of Proposition 3.1  covers the cases in which the in-
verse demand function has kinks.  In particular, it covers  the usual linear demand 
7 case,  where the inverse demand is a function of the form 
for wEn. 
{ 
a(w) - b(w)Q 
p(w,Q) = 
o 
if a(w) - b(w)Q  ~  0, 
otherwise, 
Theorem A.  Let  I  = (N, (n,:F,J-L),p,c, (:Fi)iEN)  be  an  oligopolistic  industry with 
differential information,  and let G(I) be the corresponding Cournot game with differ-
ential information.  Assume that 
(A.l) for all wEn, c(w,·) is affine on  ~+; 
(A.2)  for all  (w,x)  E n x  ~+, we  have  p(w,x) =  max{PI(w,X),P2(W, x)}, where 
PI, P2  : n x  ~+ -t  ~  are  two  uniformly integrable functions satisfying 
(A.2.l) for all wEn, PI(W,·)  and P2(W,·)  are  non-increasing and differen-
tiable on  ~+, and their derivatives  p~ and  p~ are uniformly integrable; and 
(A.2.2)  for  all  (w,x)  E  n x  ~+, if p(w,.)  is  not differentiable  at  x,  then 
PI (w, x) =  P2 (w, x). 
Let i, j  E N  be  any two firms such that Fi 2 Fj ,  and let q*  be  any Bayesian equilib-
rium of G(I). Then 
For the proof of Theorem A we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.3. Let  f  and  9  be  two  real-valued functions  that  are  defined  and differ-
entiable  on  a neighborhood of Xo  E  ~+, and such that  f(xo)  =  g(xo)  and  f'(xo)  = 
g'(xo)  = a.  Then  the function  h(x) = max{f(x), g(x)}  is  differentiable  at  Xo  and 
h'(xo) =  a. 
Proof: Let 
.  h(x) - h(xo) 
Q =  limx--+xo.x>xo  x - Xo  ' 
and 
_  -.  h(x) - h(xo) 
a =  limx--+xo.x>xo  .  X-Xo 
We show that Q = a =  a.  Since for  all x > Xo 
h(x) - h(xo)  h(x) - f(xo)  f(x) - f(xo) 
~~--~~=  ~  , 
x - Xo  x - Xo  x - Xo 
8 we must have 
.  f(x) - f(xo) 
Q ~  hmx-+xo,x>xo  =  a.  X-Xo 
Assume,  contrary to our claim, that a > a.  Then there exists a sequence  {xn}~=l 
such that Xn  > Xo  for all n, limn-+oo Xn = xo,  and 
li  h(xn) - h(xo)  -
illn-+oo  =  a > a. 
Xn  -Xo 
Since h(xn)  =  max{f(xn),g(xn)} for  all  n, there exists a subsequence  {Yn}~l of 
{xn}~l such that either h(Yn)  =  f(Yn)  or h(Yn)  =  g(Yn)  for  all n. As  f(xo)  =  g(xo) 
and f'(xo) =  g'(xo) =  a, we have 
liilln-+oo h(Yn) - h(xo)  =  a, 
Yn -Xo 
which contradicts our assumption that a > a. Thus, h'-t exists at Xo  and h'-t(xo)  =  a. 
In a similar way it can be shown that h'- exists at Xo  and h'-(xo) =  a.  0 
We now can prove our main result. 
Proof of Theorem A: Let  I  =  (N, (0., F, J.l),p, c, (:fi)iEN)  be an oligopolistic 
industry with differential information satisfying the assumptions of Theorem A.  As 
in the proof of Proposition 3.1,  we  assume,  without loss  of generality,  that for  all 
w E  !1,  c(w,O)  =  0,  and we identify p(w,·)  with p(w,·) - d(w),  where d : 0.  - ~+ 
denotes the marginal cost function.  Let i, j  E N be such that Fi 2 Fj , and let q*  be 
a Bayesian equilibrium of G(I). As before, write Q* =  EiEN q;. Define 
A = {w E 0. I  PI(W, Q*(w)) = P2(W, Q*(w)) and p~(w,  Q*(w))  =I- p~(w,  Q*(w))}. 
Then by (A.2.1), A E F. For all (w,x) En x ~+  let 
~(  )  {PI(W,X)  wEA,  PI  w,x  = 
p(w, x)  w fJ.  A, 
and 
~ (  )  {P2(W, x)  wE A,  P2  W,X  = 
p(w, x)  w fJ.  A. 
Then by  (A.2.1),  (A.2.2)  and Lemma 3.3, PI(W,·)  and P2(W,·)  are differentiable at 
Q*(w), for  all wEn. Now 
9 p(W, Q*(W)) = ih(W, Q*(w)) = fJ2(w, Q*(w)), 
for all wEn. Therefore for  all kEN we have 
E(7rk(·, q*(.)) Irk)  - qkE(P(·, Q*(.)) Irk) 
- qkE(Pl(-, Q*(.»  Irk) 
- qkE(P2(·, Q*(.»  Irk). 
For all kEN, let Q"k  =  2:IEN\{k} q;. For all (w, x) En x  ~+ define 
hk(w, x)  =  xE(p(·, x + Qk(·»  Irk)(W); 
define also 
and 
Then by Lemma 3.2 and (3.9) we have 
Now for  all (w, x) En x  ~+ we have 
hk(w, x)  - xE(max{Pl(·' x + Qk(·»,P2(·, x +  Qk(-))} Irk)(W) 
(3.9) 
>  xmax{E(Pl(·,X+Qk(·»  Irk)(W),E(fJ2(·,X+Qk(·»  Irk)(W)} 
Since q*  is a Bayesian equilibrium of G(I), for all kEN and wEn, the function 
hk(w,·)  attains a maximum at qZ(w).  By the above inequality we  have fk(W, x)  ~ 
hk(w, x),  for  all  (w, x)  E  n x  ~+. Since  hk(w, qZ(w))  =  !k(W, qZ(w»,  the function 
A(w,.) also attains a maximum at qZ(w)  for  all wEn. Hence, since for  all wEn, 
the function A(w,·) is differentiable at qZ(w), we have 
f~(w, qZ(w» =  0, 
10 for all kEN and wEn. Now, Lemma 3.2 yields 
Since for  all wEn, the function ih(W,·)  is  non-increasing on )R+,  by (3.9)  and the 
same arguments that were used in the proof of Proposition 3.1 (applied to PI  and p~) 
we obtain 
The assumption that marginal cost is constant plays a critical role in the proofs 
of our results.  Under this assumption firms' cost can be ignored, and the information 
advantage, allowing a firm to better accomodate its actions to an uncertain environ-
met, results in higher profits.  When marginal cost is  not constant, however,  in a 
Bayesian equilibrium a firm that cannot discern between two states of nature may 
find  it  optimal to produce a  quantity that is  not  very different  from  the average 
quantity of a better informed firm.  As the following example shows, if marginal cost 
is increasing a firm with worse information may have a  "cost advantage"  that may 
upset its "information disadvantage." 
Example 3.4. Let I = (N, (n,F,J.1-),p,c, (Fi)iEN)  be an oligopolistic industry with 
differentialinformation where N = {1,2}, n = {Wl,W2}, F = 2'\ J.1-({wd) = J.1-({W2}), 
Fl =  F  (i.e., Firm 1 is completely informed), F2  =  {0, n} (i.e., Firm 2 is completely 
uninformed); the market demand function is given by 
and 
{ 
120 - 2Q  if 0 < Q < 60, 
P(WbQ)) =  - -
o  otherwise, 
{ 
80 - Q  if 0 ~  Q ~  80, 
P(W2,Q) = 
o  otherwise. 
Firms' cost function is  c(w, q)  = q2  for  all  (w, q)  E  n x  )R+.  The strategy profile 
q*  = (q;,q;),  where q;(Wl)  =  11
6
igO,  q;(W2)  =  ;~o, and q2(Wl)  = q;(W2)  =  II~O, is  a 
Bayesianequilibrium of the associated Cournot game with differential information 
G (1).  Direct computation yields 
E(7rl(·, q*(.))) =  592.05 < 593.89 = E(7r2(·, q*(.))). 
11 4  Information Advantage in Correlated Equilibria 
In this section we study the consequences of Theorem A for  oligopolistic industries 
with complete information,  and we  establish that the (correlated) equilibria of the 
associated Cournot game with complete information have a property analogous to 
the Bayesian equilibria of the Cournot game with incomplete information; namely, in 
a correlated equilibrium relative to a correlation device for  which a Firm A has an 
information advantage over Firm B, the profits of Firm A are greater than or equal 
to the profits of Firm B. 
An n-person non-coopemtive game with complete information (or simply a game) 
is  a collection r  = (N,  AI' ... ' Am Ull ... ,Un),  where N  = {1, ... , n} is the set of 
players, and for  each i  E  N,  ~  and Ui  :  TIj=1 Aj -+ ~  are,  respectively,  the set of 
actions and the payoff function of Player i. Let r  be a game;  a  correlation  device 
for r is a collection D =  ((n,F,J.L), ('Pi)i=l) , where (n,F,J.L)  is a probability space, 
and for  all i  E N, 'Pi  is  a measurable partition of n. For every i  E N  let ~  be the 
a-subfield of F  generated by 'Pi,  and let Si  be the set of all ~-measurable functions 
from n to~.  Write S =  TIjEN Sj. 
Let r be a game, and let D =  ((n,F,J.L), ('Pi)iEN)  be a correlation device for r; a 
correlated equilibrium of r relative to  D is an n-tuple s* = (si, ...  ,s~) such that for 
all i  E N  and all Si  E Si we have 
The notion of correlated equilibrium was introduced in Aumann (1974).  A cor-
related equilibrium can be interpreted as the outcome of Bayesian rationality (see 
Aumann (1987)).  Several equivalent formulations have been suggested (see Aumann 
(1974,  1987), and Section 2.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991».  The set of correlated 
equilibria of linear Cournot oligopoly is studied in Liu (1995). 
An oligopolistic industry with complete information is  a collection I  =  (N, p, c), 
where N  =  {1, ... , n} is the set of firms, p : ~+  -+ ~  is the inverse demand function 
and c : ~+  -+ ~  is the cost function of every firm.  The Cournot game with complete 
information associated to an oligopolistic industry with complete information I  = 
12 
,,' (N,p, c)  is defined by r(I) =  (N, ~+,  ...  ,~+,  71"1, ••• , 7I"n),  where for i E N, the profit 
function of Firm i, 7I"i  :  ~+  ~  ~  is given for r E  ~+ by 
7I"i(r)  =  riP(L  rj) - c(ri)' 
jEN 
Theorem B. Let I =  (N,p, c)  be an oligopolistic industry with complete information, 
and let r(I) be the corresponding Cournot game with complete information.  Assume 
that 
(B.1)  c(·)  is affine on  ~+; 
(B.2)  for all x E  ~+, p(x) =  max{Pl(x),P2(X)}, where Pl,P2 : ~+  ~  ~  satisfy 
(B.2.1)  PI  and P2  are differentiable and non-increasing on  ~+; and 
(B.2.2)  for all  x E  ~+, if P is not differentiable at x, then Pl(X) =  P2{X). 
Let  s*  be  a  correlated  equilibrium  of r(I)  relative  to  a  correlation  device  D  -
((0"  F, ft), (Pi)i=I)'  and let i,j E N.  If Pi  is at least as fine  as  Pj, then 
Proof:  Let  I  =  (N,p, c)  be an oligopolistic  industry with complete informa-
tion satisfying the assumptions of Theorem B, and let s*  be a correlated equilibrium 
of the associated Cournot game with complete information r(I) relative to a cor-
relation device  D  =  ((0"  F, ft), (Pi)i=I)'  For  each  i  E  N  let  J=i  be the u-subfield 
of F  generated  by  Pi.  Consider  the Cournot  game  with  differential  information 
G(I)  =  (N,(0"F,ft),~+,(J=i)iEN,(7I"i)iEN)' (Note that the payoff functions  7I"i  are 
not state dependent.)  By Remark 2.1,  any correlated equilibrium  s*  of r(I) is  a 
Bayesian equilibrium of G(I). Let i,j E  N  be two firms  such that Pi  is  at least as 
fine  as Pj . By Theorem A we have 
13 References 
[1]  Aumann, R.J. (1974):  "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," 
Journal of Mathematical Economics 1,67-96. 
[2]  Aumann,  R.J.  (1987):  "Correlated Equilibrium as  an Expression of Bayesian 
Rationality,"  Econometrica 55, 1-18. 
[3]  Billingsley, P (1995):  Probability and Measure, John Wiley and Sons:  New York. 
[4]  Einy,  E.  D.  Moreno,  and B.  Shitovitz (1998):  "Existence and Equivalence of 
Competitive and Core Allocations in Large Exchange Economies with Differen-
tial Information," Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, working paper 98-71. 
[5]  Fudenberg,  D.,  and J.  Tirole (1991):  Game  Theory,  MIT press:  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
[6]  Harsanyi,  J.C.  (1967-68):  "Games  with  Incomplete  Information  Played  by 
Bayesian Players,"  Parts I-Ill, Management Science,  14,  159-182,  320-334,  and 
486-502. 
[7]  Jackson, M.  (1993):  "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, 59, 461-477. 
[8]  Koutsougeras, L.C., and N.C. Yannelis (1993):  "Incentive Compatibility and In-
formation Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," 
Economic  Theory, 3, 195-216. 
[9]  Krasa, S., and N.C. Yannelis (1994):  "The Value Allocation of an Economy with 
Differential Information,"  Econometrica, 62, 881-900. 
[10]  Liu,  L.  (1996):  "Correlated equilibrium of Cournot  Oligopoly  Competition," 
Journal of Economic Theory,  68, 544-548. 
[11]  Milgrom, P.  (1979):  The Structure of Information in Competitive Bidding, Gar-
land Press:  New York. 
14 [12]  Milgrom, P.  and D.J. Roberts (1982):  "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incom-
plete Information:  an Equilibrium Analysis,"  Econometrica 50, 443-459. 
[13]  Milgrom, P. and R.J. Weber (1982):  "The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid 
Auction,"  Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 105-114. 
[14]  Savage, L.J. (1954):  The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley:  New York. 
[15]  Vorha,  R.  (1999):  "Incomplete Information,  Incentive  Compatibility and the 
Core,"  Journal of Economic Theory, 86, 123-147. 
15 